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Abstract. The quantitative analysis of concurrent sys-
tems requires expressive and user-friendly property lan-
guages combining temporal, data handling, and quanti-
tative aspects. In this paper, we aim at facilitating the
quantitative analysis of systems modeled as PTSs (Prob-
abilistic Transition Systems) labeled by actions contain-
ing data values and probabilities. We propose a new reg-
ular probabilistic operator that specifies the probability
measure of a path described by a generalized regular for-
mula involving arbitrary computations on data values.
This operator, which subsumes the Until operators of
PCTL and their action-based counterparts, can provide
useful quantitative information about paths having cer-
tain (e.g., peak) cost values. We integrated the regular
probabilistic operator into MCL (Model Checking Lan-
guage) and we devised an associated on-the-fly model
checking method, based on a combined local resolution
of linear and Boolean equation systems. We implemented
the method in the EVALUATOR model checker of the
CADP toolbox and experimented it on realistic PTSs
modeling concurrent systems.
1 Introduction
Concurrent systems, which are becoming ubiquitous
nowadays, are complex software artifacts involving qual-
itative aspects (e.g., concurrent behaviour, synchroniza-
tion, data communication) as well as quantitative as-
pects (e.g., costs, probabilities, timing information). The
rigorous design of such systems based on formal methods
and model checking techniques requires versatile tem-
poral logics able to specify properties about qualitative
and quantitative aspects in a uniform, user-friendly way.
During the past two decades, a wealth of temporal logics
dealing with one or several of these aspects were defined
and equipped with analysis tools [14,7]. One of the first
logics capturing behavioral, discrete time, and proba-
bilistic information is PCTL (Probabilistic Computation
Tree Logic) [29].
In this paper, we propose a framework for specify-
ing and checking temporal logic properties combining
actions, data, probabilities, and discrete time on PTSs
(Probabilistic Transition Systems) [39], which are suit-
able action-based models for representing value-passing
concurrent systems with interleaving semantics. We con-
sider here the class of generative (also called fully proba-
bilitistic) PTSs [28], in which transition probability dis-
tributions implicitly assign probabilities to the occur-
rences of actions. These PTSs can be viewed as DTMCs
(Discrete-Time Markov Chains) in which transitions are
labeled by actions carrying probabilities, channel names,
and data values sent between concurrent processes dur-
ing handshake communication. We are interested mainly
in action-based properties, in contrast with standard
DTMCs [7, Chap. 10], where atomic propositions are
attached to states. Our contributions are twofold.
Regarding the specification of properties, we pro-
pose a new regular probabilistic operator, which spec-
ifies the probability measure of a path (specified as a
regular formula on actions) in a PTS. Several proba-
bilistic logics have been proposed in the action-based
setting. PML (Probabilistic Modal Logic) [39] is a vari-
ant of HML (Hennessy-Milner Logic) [30] with modal-
ities indexed by probabilities, and was introduced as
a modal characterization of probabilistic bisimulation
on (generative) PTSs. GPL (Generalized Probabilistic
Logic) [15] is a probabilistic variant of the alternation-
free modal µ-calculus, able to reason about execution
trees, and equipped with a model checking algorithm re-
lying on the resolution of non-linear equation systems.
Compared to these logics, our probabilistic operator is
a natural (action-based) extension of the Until operator
of PCTL: besides paths of the form a∗.b (the action-
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based counterpart of Until operators), we consider more
general paths, specified by regular formulas similar to
those of PDL (Propositional Dynamic Logic) [24]. To
handle the data values present on PTS actions, we rely
on the regular formulas with counters of MCL (Model
Checking Language) [48], an extension of first-order µ-
calculus with programming language constructs. More-
over, we enhance the MCL regular formulas with a gen-
eralized iteration operator parameterized by data values,
thus making possible the specification of complex (Tur-
ing computable) paths in a PTS.
Regarding the evaluation of regular probabilistic for-
mulas on PTSs, we devise an on-the-fly model check-
ing method based on translating the problem into the
simultaneous local resolution of a linear equation sys-
tem (LES) and a Boolean equation system (BES). For
probabilistic operators containing dataless MCL regu-
lar formulas, the sizes of the LES and BES are linear
in the size of the PTS and linear (resp. exponential) in
the size of the regular formula, depending whether it is
deterministic or not. In the action-based setting, the de-
terminism of formulas is essential for a sound translation
of the verification problem to a LES. For general data
handling MCL regular formulas, the termination of the
model checking procedure is guaranteed for a large class
of formulas (e.g., counting, bounded iteration, aggrega-
tion of values, computation of costs over paths, etc.) and
the sizes of the equation systems depend on the data pa-
rameters occurring in formulas. It is worth noticing that
on-the-fly verification algorithms for PCTL were pro-
posed only recently [40], all previous implementations,
e.g., in PRISM [36] having focused on global algorithms.
Our method provides on-the-fly verification for PCTL
and its action-based variant PACTL, and also for PPDL
(Probabilistic PDL) [35], which are subsumed by the
regular probabilistic operator of MCL. We implemented
the method in the EVALUATOR [48] on-the-fly model
checker of the CADP toolbox [27] and experimented it on
various examples of value-passing concurrent systems.
Related work. Most of the works on action-based log-
ics for quantitative analysis have concentrated on
continuous-time models. CSL (Continuous Stochastic
Logic) [4,6] is a continuous-time variant of PCTL inter-
preted on CTMCs (Continuous-Time Markov Chains).
aCSL (action-based CSL) [31], interpreted on action-
labeled CTMCs, is the action-based counterpart of CSL
suitable for action-oriented modeling formalisms, such
as stochastic process algebras. aCSL was defined in a
way similar to ACTL (Action-based CTL) [49], which is
the action-based counterpart of CTL [13]. In our set-
ting, we can encode probabilistic versions of the ACTL
operators, which are discrete-time counterparts of the
time-bounded probability operators of aCSL. This logic
was subsequently extended with regular operators simi-
lar to those of PDL, leading to the strictly more expres-
sive logic asCSL [5] interpreted on state- and action-
labeled CTMCs. The purpose of asCSL was to enable
the specification of complex properties of finite compu-
tations with real-time constraints. We had a similar mo-
tivation for our regular probabilistic operator on PTSs,
and we extended its expressiveness further by adding
data-handling mechanisms.
In the state-based setting, the logic closest to ours is
QuaTEx (Quantitative Temporal Expressions) [1], which
combines constructs from PCTL and the rule-based
query language EAGLE [8]. In QuaTEx, paths are de-
scribed using recursive temporal operators with data pa-
rameters, built over a next-time operator and conditional
path expressions. QuaTEx queries are evaluated using
statistical model checking on GSMPs (Generalized Semi-
Markov Processes) produced from actor-based proba-
bilistic programs written in the PMaude language [1].
Instead of recursive path formulas, our data-handling
probabilistic operator extends the regular expressions
over paths with a generalized iteration operator, yielding
more concise specifications of step-bounded properties.
Organization of the paper. This paper is an extended
version of a conference paper [45], to which it adds the
following material: (i) an enhanced review of related
work; (ii) an in-depth presentation of the proposed logic,
with more examples of properties, and of the proposed
on-the-fly model checking procedure; (iii) further exper-
imental validation on three probabilistic systems (BRP
protocol and two randomized protocols) and a compari-
son with the PRISM model checker.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 defines the dataless regular probabilistic opera-
tor and Section 3 presents the on-the-fly model checking
method. Section 4 is devoted to the data handling ex-
tensions. Section 5 briefly describes the implementation
of the method within CADP and Section 6 illustrates
it for the quantitative analysis of several protocols. Fi-
nally, Section 7 gives concluding remarks and directions
of future work.
2 Dataless regular probabilistic operator
As interpretation models, we consider generative PTSs
(Probabilistic Transition Systems) [39], in which transi-
tions between states carry both action and probabilistic
information. A PTS M =
〈
S,A, T,P, si
〉
comprises a
set of states S, a set of actions A, a transition relation
T ⊆ S×A×S, a probability labeling P : T → (0, 1], and
an initial state si ∈ S. A transition (s, a, s′) ∈ T (also
written s
a→ s′) indicates that the system can move from
state s to state s′ by performing action a with proba-
bility P(s, a, s′). For each state s ∈ S, the probability
sum
∑
s
a→s′ P(s, a, s
′) = 1. These PTS models do not
contain nondeterminism, but probabilistic choice, i.e., a
transition s
a→ s′ assigns implicitly the same probability
P(s, a, s′) to the occurrence of a.
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Action formulas:
α ::= a
| false
| ¬α1
| α1 ∨ α2
b |=A a
b |=A false
b |=A ¬α1
b |=A α1 ∨ α2
iff b = a
iff false
iff b 6|=A α1
iff b |=A α1 or b |=A α2
Regular formulas:
β ::= α
| ϕ?
| β1.β2
| β1|β2
| β∗1
σ[i, j] |=M α
σ[i, j] |=M ϕ?
σ[i, j] |=M β1.β2
σ[i, j] |=M β1|β2
σ[i, j] |=M β∗1
iff i+ 1 = j and σa[i] |=A α
iff i = j and σ[i] |=M ϕ
iff ∃k ∈ [i, j].σ[i, k] |=M β1 and σ[k, j] |=M β2
iff σ[i, j] |=M β1 or σ[i, j] |=M β2
iff i = j or ∃k > 0.σ[i, j] |=M βk1
State formulas:
ϕ ::= false
| ¬ϕ1
| ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
| 〈β〉ϕ1
| {β}≥p
| {β}>p
s |=M false
s |=M ¬ϕ1
s |=M ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
s |=M 〈β〉ϕ1
s |=M {β}≥p
s |=M {β}>p
iff false
iff s 6|=M ϕ1
iff s |=M ϕ1 or s |=M ϕ2
iff ∃σ ∈ PathsM (s).∃i ≥ 0.σ[0, i] |=M β and σ[i] |=M ϕ1
iff PrM ({σ ∈ PathsM (s) | ∃i ≥ 0.σ[0, i] |=M β}) ≥ p
iff PrM ({σ ∈ PathsM (s) | ∃i ≥ 0.σ[0, i] |=M β}) > p
Fig. 1: Modal and probabilistic operators over regular paths
A path σ = s(= s0)
a0→ s1 a1→ · · · an−1→ sn · · · going out
of a state s is an infinite sequence of transitions in M .
The i-th state and i-th action of a path σ are noted σ[i]
and σa[i], respectively. An interval σ[i, j] with 0 ≤ i ≤ j
is the path fragment σ[i]
ai→ · · · aj−1→ σ[j], which reduces
to the single-state path σ[i] if i = j. The suffix of a path
σ starting at state σ[i] is noted σi. The set of paths going
out of s is noted PathsM (s).
The probability space associated to a PTS M is
defined similarly to DTMCs: the outcomes are paths
and the basic events are the cylinder sets defined as
Cyl(s0
a0→ · · · an−1→ sn) = {σ ∈ PathsM (s0) | σ[0, n] =
s0
a0→ · · · an−1→ sn}, i.e., sets of paths sharing a common
prefix. The σ-algebra associated to M is the smallest one
containing all cylinder sets, and the probability measure
of cylinder sets is defined as PrM (Cyl(s0
a0→ · · · an−1→
sn)) = Π0≤i<nP(si, ai, si+1). By Caratheodory’s exten-
sion theorem in classical measure theory [23], this prob-
ability measure uniquely extends to the σ-algebra, i.e.,
to all events (sets of paths) defined as countable unions
of cylinder sets.
The regular probabilistic operator that we propose
specifies the probability measure of paths characterized
by regular formulas. For the dataless version of the oper-
ator, we use the regular formulas of PDL (Propositional
Dynamic Logic) [24], defined over the action formulas
of ACTL (Action-based CTL) [49]. Figure 1 shows the
syntax and semantics of the operators.
Action formulas α are built over the set of actions by
using standard Boolean connectors. Derived action op-
erators can be defined as usual: true = ¬false, α1 ∧α2 =
¬(¬α1 ∨ ¬α2), etc. Regular formulas β are built from
action formulas by using the testing (?), concatenation
(.), choice (|), and transitive reflexive closure (∗) opera-
tors. Derived regular operators can be defined as usual:
nil = false∗ is the empty path operator, β+ = β.β∗ is
the transitive closure operator, etc. State formulas ϕ are
built from Boolean connectors, the possibility modality
(〈 〉) and the probabilistic operators ({ }≥p and { }>p)
containing regular formulas. In line with the original def-
inition of PCTL [29], we considered both strict (> p) and
non strict (≥ p) conditions on the probability. Derived
state operators can be defined as usual: true = ¬false,
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 = ¬(¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2), and [β]ϕ = ¬ 〈β〉 ¬ϕ is the
necessity modality.
Action formulas are interpreted on the set of actions
A in the usual way, as propositional formulas denoting
subsets of actions [49]. A path σ satisfies a regular for-
mula β, noted σ |=M β, if ∃i ≥ 0.σ[0, i] |=M β, i.e., it
has a prefix belonging to the regular language defined
by β. The testing operator ϕ? of PDL specifies state
formulas ϕ that must hold in the intermediate states
of a path. Concatenation, choice, and transitive reflex-
ive closure on regular formulas are defined in the stan-
dard way (βk denotes the concatenation of β with itself
k times). Boolean connectors on states are defined as
usual. A state s satisfies the possibility modality 〈β〉ϕ1
(resp. the necessity modality [β]ϕ1) iff some (resp. all)
of the paths in PathsM (s) have a prefix satisfying β and
leading to a state satisfying ϕ1. A state s satisfies the
probabilistic operator {β}≥p iff the probability measure
of the paths in PathsM (s) with a prefix satisfying β is
greater or equal to p (and similarly for the strict version
of the operator). A PTS M =
〈
S,A, T,P, si
〉
satisfies
a formula ϕ, denoted by M |= ϕ, iff si |=M ϕ (the
subscript M will be omitted when it is clear from the
context).
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We show below some examples of properties express-
ible in the logic. Safety properties, which express that
“something bad never happens” [41], can be specified
using the modality [β] false, where the regular formula β
denotes the undesirable paths and the box modality for-
bids their occurrence. Thus, mutual exclusion between
two processes can be expressed as:
[true∗.access1.(¬release1)∗.access2] false
meaning that all paths containing an access of process 1
to a shared resource followed by an access of process 2
before process 1 has released the resource lead necessar-
ily to states satisfying false, i.e., never occur.
The absence of deadlocks (sink states), a necessary
condition for a well-defined PTS, can be specified by for-
bidding the paths leading to a deadlock (denoted by the
modality [true] false), or alternatively by imposing that
all reachable states have at least one successor (denoted
by the modality 〈true〉 true):
¬ 〈true∗〉 [true] false = [true∗] 〈true〉 true
The existential Until operator of CTL can be speci-
fied using a diamond modality as follows:
E [ϕ1 U ϕ2] = 〈(ϕ1?.true)∗〉ϕ2
expressing that the current state has an outgoing path
leading to a state satisfying ϕ2 after zero or more tran-
sitions whose source states satisfy ϕ1 (denoted by the
regular subformula ϕ1?.true). Similarly, the existential
Until operators of ACTL are specified as follows:
E
[
ϕ1α1 U ϕ2
]
= 〈(ϕ1?.α1)∗〉ϕ2
E
[
ϕ1α1 Uα2 ϕ2
]
= 〈(ϕ1?.α1)∗.ϕ1?.α2〉ϕ2
These action-based operators specify properties about
both source states and actions of the intermediate tran-
sitions (denoted by the regular subformulas ϕ1?.α1) and
— for the second Until operator — also the last transi-
tion of the path fragment (denoted by the regular sub-
formula ϕ1?.α2).
The probabilistic operator expresses constraints on
the probability of occurrence of certain paths described
using regular formulas. The formula below specifies that
the probability to send a message along an unreliable
channel and receive it finally (possibly after a finite num-
ber of retries) is at least 90%:
{send .(true∗.retry)∗.recv}≥0.9
By combining the modalities of PDL and the proba-
bilistic operator, one can express quantitative response
properties. The formula below specifies that every re-
quest of accessing a resource will be granted with prob-
ability 1 (i.e., almost surely):
[true∗.request ] {true∗.grant}≥1
The operator {β}≥p generalizes naturally the Until
operators of classical probabilistic branching-time logics.
The Until operator of PCTL [29] without discrete time
(i.e., without the step-bounding clause U≤t), and proba-
bilistic versions of the two Until operators of ACTL are
expressed as follows:
[ϕ1 U ϕ2]≥p = {(ϕ1?.true)∗.ϕ2?}≥p[
ϕ1α1 U ϕ2
]
≥p = {(ϕ1?.α1)∗.ϕ2?}≥p[
ϕ1α1 Uα2 ϕ2
]
≥p = {(ϕ1?.α1)∗.ϕ1?.α2.ϕ2?}≥p
These encodings consider the Until operators as a means
of describing path fragments, and reformulate them us-
ing regular operators, which are strictly more expressive:
for instance, the regular formula (true.true.ϕ?)+ denot-
ing the path fragments in which ϕ holds at even states is
not expressible using Until operators [50]. Our extension
of regular formulas with data handling (see Section 4)
will enable to express also the step-bounded Until oper-
ators, and therefore to subsume full P(A)CTL.
Measurability of β-events. The probabilistic operator
{β}≥p interpreted on a state s refers to the probabil-
ity measure of the set of paths going out of s and hav-
ing a prefix satisfying β, defined as Paths(s, β) = {σ ∈
Paths(s) | σ |=M β}. For this semantics to be well-
defined, the set Paths(s, β) must be measurable, i.e., it
must be an event of the σ-algebra associated to the PTS
M . This follows directly from the definition of {β}≥p
in Figure 1, because Paths(s, β) can be considered as a
countable union of cylinder sets:
Paths(s, β) = {σ ∈ Paths(s) | σ |=M β}
= {σ ∈ Paths(s) | ∃i ≥ 0.σ[0, i] |=M β}
=
⋃
i ≥ 0
σ[0, i] ∈ Pathsfin(s)
σ[0, i] |=M β
Cyl(σ[0, i])
where Pathsfin(s) is the set of finite paths going out
of s. The countable union above can be computed by
enumerating, for each i ≥ 0, all finite path fragments
σ[0, i] ∈ Pathsfin(s) of length i and checking whether
they satisfy β. This last check can be done by verifying
the PDL formula 〈β〉 [true] false on s in the LTS consist-
ing solely of the finite path fragment σ[0, i] by using,
e.g., the model checking procedure given in [22].
3 Model checking method
We propose below a method for checking a regular prob-
abilistic formula on a PTS on the fly, by reformulating
the problem as the simultaneous resolution of a linear
equation system (LES) and a Boolean equation system
(BES). The method consists of five steps, each one trans-
lating the problem into an increasingly concrete inter-
mediate formalism. The first four steps operate syntacti-
cally on formulas and their intermediate representations,
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whereas the fifth step makes use of semantic information
contained in the PTS. A detailed formalization of the
first two steps can be found in [47], and of the third and
fourth steps (in a state-based setting) in [44].
We illustrate the model checking method using the
classical example of a six-sided dice emulated using a
fair coin [33]. First, we consider a dataless version of the
system (i.e., in which actions are simply names), repre-
sented as a PTS in Figure 2(a). The actions of tossing
a head or tail of the coin are denoted by head and tail,
each one having 0.5 probability. The actions correspond-
ing to the dice faces are denoted by dicei for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6,
each one occurring with probability 1. We will check on
this PTS the formula Ψ1, stating that the probability of
reaching the dice side marked with four directly after
tossing the last head (if any) is at least 1/6:
Ψ1 = {(true∗.head)∗.dice4}≥0.16
Strictly speaking, this formula could be verified us-
ing a PACTL model checker, since the regular sub-
formula can be expressed equivalently without nested
star operators as dice4|(true∗.head .dice4). The exis-
tence of a path matching it can be specified in
ACTL using two Until operators: E [truefalse Udice4 true]∨
E [truetrue Uhead E [truefalse Udice4 true]]. This would re-
quire the model checker to compute the probability mea-
sures of each Until operator, then check that their sum
is at least 0.16. However, we use formula Ψ1 for the sake
of simplicity to illustrate our model checking procedure.
Examples of more complex properties, most of them un-
expressible in PACTL, can be found in Section 6.
1. Translation to PDL with recursion. To evaluate an
operator {β}≥p on a PTS M =
〈
S,A, T,P, si
〉
on the
fly, one needs to determine the set of paths going out of
si and satisfying β, to compute the probability measure
of this set, and to compare it with p. For this purpose, it
is more appropriate to use an equational representation
of β, namely PDLR (PDL with recursion), which was
introduced in [47] for model checking PDL formulas. A
PDLR specification is a system of fixed point equations
having propositional variables X ∈ X in their left hand
side and PDL formulas ϕ in their right hand side:
{Xi = ϕi}1≤i≤n
where ϕi are modal state formulas (see Fig. 1) and X1
is the variable of interest corresponding to the desired
property. Since formulas ϕi may be open (i.e., contain oc-
currences of variables Xj), their interpretation is defined
w.r.t. a propositional context ρ : X → 2S , which assigns
state sets to all variables occurring in ϕi. The interpre-
tation of a PDLR specification is the value of X1 in the
least fixed point µΦ of the functional Φ : (2S)n → (2S)n
defined by:
Φ(U1, ..., Un) = 〈[[ϕi]] ρ [U1/X1, ..., Un/Xn]〉1≤i≤n
where [[ϕi]] ρ = {s ∈ S | s |=ρ ϕi}, and the interpreta-
tion of ϕi (see Fig. 1) is extended with the rule “s |=ρ
X iff s ∈ ρ(X)”. The notation ρ  [U1/X1, ..., Un/Xn]
stands for the context ρ in which Xi were assigned Ui.
In the sequel, we consider PDLR specifications in
derivative normal form (RNF), which are the modal
logic counterparts of Brzozowski’s (generalized) deriva-
tives of regular expressions [10]:{
Xi =
∨ni
j=1(ϕij ∧ 〈βij〉Xij) ∨ ϕi
}
1≤i≤n
where ϕij and ϕi are closed state formulas. Note that,
in the right hand side of equation i, the same variable
Xij ∈ {X1, ..., Xn} may occur several times in the first
disjunct. Intuitively, a variable Xi denotes the set of
states from which there exists a path with a prefix sat-
isfying some of the regular formulas βij and whose last
state satisfies Xij . This is formalized using path pred-
icates Pi : PathsM → bool, defined by the following
system of equations:
Pi(σ) =
∨ni
j=1∃lij ≥ 0.(σ[0] |= ϕij ∧
σ[0, lij ] |= βij ∧ Pij(σlij ))
∨
σ[0] |= ϕi

1≤i≤n
More precisely, (µΦ)i = {s ∈ S | ∃σ ∈ PathsM (s).Pi(σ)}.
The PDLR specification in RNF associated to a for-
mula β is defined below:
{X1 = 〈β〉X2 X2 = true}
in which the variable of interest X1 denotes the PDL
formula 〈β〉 true, expressing the existence of a path with
a prefix satisfying β and leading to some final state de-
noted by X2. The corresponding path predicates are:
{P1(σ) = ∃l ≥ 0.(σ[0, l] |= β ∧ P2(σl)) P2(σ) = true}
According to the interpretation of regular formulas (see
Fig. 1), the path predicate P1(σ) holds iff σ |= β, and
also (µΦ)1 = {s ∈ S | ∃σ ∈ PathsM (s).σ |= β}.
2. Translation to HML with recursion. To bring the
PDLR specification closer to an equation system suit-
able for verification, one must simplify it by removing
the regular operators occurring in modalities. This yields
a HMLR (HML with recursion) specification [38], which
contains only HML modalities on action formulas. Regu-
lar operators can be eliminated by applying the following
substitutions, which are valid equalities in PDL [24]:
〈ϕ?〉X = ϕ ∧ 〈nil〉X
〈β1.β2〉X = 〈β1〉X ′ where X ′ = 〈β2〉X
〈β1|β2〉X = 〈β1〉X ∨ 〈β2〉X
〈β∗〉X = 〈nil〉X ′ where X ′ = 〈nil〉X ∨ 〈β〉X ′
The rules for the ‘.’ and ‘*’ operators create new equa-
tions, necessary for maintaining the PDLR specification
in RNF (the insertion of 〈nil〉X modalities, which are
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s0
s3 s4 s5 s6
s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12
dice6 1.0dice4 1.0
head 0.5
tail 0.5
head 0.5
s2s1
head 0.5
tail 0.5
tail 0.5
tail 0.5
head 0.5 tail 0.5
dice1 1.0 dice2 1.0 dice5 1.0dice3 1.0
head 0.5 tail 0.5
head 0.5tail 0.5 head 0.5
(a) PTS (dataless version){
X1 = 〈(true∗.head)∗.dice4〉X2
X2 = true
} 
X1 = 〈nil〉X4
X2 = true
X3 = 〈dice4〉X2
X4 = 〈nil〉X3 ∨ 〈nil〉X5
X5 = 〈nil〉X7
X6 = 〈head〉X4
X7 = 〈nil〉X6 ∨ 〈true〉X7


X1 = 〈dice4〉X2 ∨ 〈head〉X1 ∨ 〈true〉X7
X2 = true
X7 = 〈head〉X1 ∨ 〈true〉X7

(b) PDLR (c) HMLR (d) guarded HMLR
X1 = 〈dice4〉X2 ∨ 〈head〉X1 ∨
〈¬(head ∨ dice4)〉X7
X2 = true
X7 = 〈head〉X1 ∨ 〈¬head〉X7


Z1,0 = 0.5 · Z1,1 + 0.5 · Z7,2
Z7,2 = 0.5 · Z1,5 + 0.5 · Z7,6
Z1,5 = 0.5 · Z1,10 + 0.5 · Z7,11
Z1,10 = 1.0
Z7,6 = 0.5 · Z1,2 + 0.5 · Z7,12
Z1,2 = 0.5 · Z1,5 + 0.5 · Z7,6


X1,1 = X1,3 ∨X7,4
X1,3 = X1,7
X1,7 = X7,7
X7,4 = X1,8 ∨X7,9
X1,8 = X7,8
X7,7 = X7,7
X7,8 = X7,8
X7,9 = X7,9
X7,11 = X7,11
X7,12 = X7,12

(e) deterministic HMLR (f) LES (g) BES (excerpt)
Fig. 2: Model checking formula Ψ1 = {(true∗.head)∗.dice4}≥0.16 on the PTS simulating the six-sided dice using a coin
equivalent to X, serves the same purpose). The rule for
the ‘|’ operator creates two occurrences of the same vari-
able X, reflecting that a same state can be reached by
two different paths. These rules preserve the path pred-
icates Pi associated to the PDLR specification, and in
particular P1(σ), which specifies that a path σ satisfies
the initial formula β.
The size of the resulting HMLR specification (num-
ber of variables and operators) is linear w.r.t. the size
of β (number of operators and action formulas). Besides
pure HML modalities, the HMLR specification may also
contain occurrences of 〈nil〉X modalities, which will be
eliminated in the next step.
3. Transformation to guarded form. The right hand side
of an equation i of the HMLR specification may contain
modalities of the form 〈αij〉Xij and 〈nil〉Xij (equivalent
to Xij), which correspond to guarded and unguarded oc-
currences of variables Xij , respectively. To facilitate the
formulation of the verification problem in terms of equa-
tion systems, it is useful to remove unguarded occur-
rences of variables. The general procedure for transform-
ing arbitrary µ-calculus formulas to guarded form [34]
can be specialized for HMLR specifications by applying
the following actions for each equation defining Xi:
– Remove the unguarded occurrences of Xi in the right
hand side of the equation defining Xi by replac-
ing them with false, which amounts to apply the µ-
calculus equality µX.(X ∨ ϕ) = µX.ϕ.
– Substitute all unguarded occurrences of Xi in other
equations with the right hand side formula of equa-
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tion i, and rearrange the right hand sides to maintain
the equations in RNF.
This produces a guarded HMLR specification:{
Xi =
∨ni
j=1(ϕij ∧ 〈αij〉Xij) ∨ ϕi
}
1≤i≤n
which is the exact modal logic counterpart of Brzo-
zowski’s derivatives of regular expressions [10] defined
on the alphabet of action formulas. The transformation
to guarded form generally decreases the number of equa-
tions in the HMLR specification (by producing unreach-
able and/or duplicate equations, which are eliminated),
but may increase the number of operators in the right
hand sides.
4. Determinization. A guarded HMLR specification
may contain, in the right hand side of an equation i, sev-
eral alternatives ϕij ∧〈αij〉Xij whose guards ϕij and/or
action formulas αij are not disjoint, i.e., they can match
the same transition going out of the current state. This is
a form of nondeterminism, meaning that the same tran-
sition s
a→ s′ can start a path σ satisfying the path pred-
icate Pi(σ) in several ways, corresponding to alternative
suffixes of the initial regular formula β. To ensure a cor-
rect translation of the verification problem into a LES,
it is necessary to determinize the equations. This can be
done by applying the classical subset construction, which
produces a deterministic HMLR specification defined on
meta-variables (i.e., sets of propositional variables):
XI =
∨
∅⊂J⊆alt(I)
∨
∅⊂L⊆J
((∧
ij∈Jϕij ∧
∧
i′j′∈alt(I)\J¬ ϕi′j′
)
∧〈∧
kl∈Lαkl ∧
∧
k′l′∈J\L¬ αk′l′
〉
XL)
∨∨
i∈Iϕi

I⊆[1,n]
where I ⊆ [1, n] is a subset of the variable indices
and XI is a shorthand notation for the meta-variable
{Xi | i ∈ I}. Given a subset I, the set of indices of al-
ternatives contained in the equations defining variables
in XI is alt(I) = {ij | i ∈ I ∧ j ∈ [1, ni]}. A transition
s
a→ s′ matches an alternative ϕij ∧ 〈αij〉Xij if s |= ϕij ,
a |= αij , and s′ |= Xij . Intuitively, the right hand side
of the meta-equation defining XI is obtained by consid-
ering all situations when a transition s
a→ s′ matches a
subset of the alternatives alt(I) and requiring that the
target state s′ satisfies the meta-variable induced by the
matching alternatives. For a transition s
a→ s′ to match
a subset of alternatives J ⊆ alt(I), state s must sat-
isfy all guards ϕij of alternatives in J , and none of the
guards of alternatives in alt(I) \ J . Then, for all modal-
ities 〈αij〉Xij contained in the alternatives in J , it may
be the case that a satisfies only the action formulas con-
tained in a subset L ⊆ J of alternatives (and none of the
action formulas of the alternatives in J\L), and therefore
s′ must satisfy the meta-variable XL. As shown in [44]
for a similar construction in the state-based setting, the
determinization preserves the path predicate associated
to the variables of interest X1 and X{1} in the HMLR
before and after determinization, i.e., P1(σ) = P{1}(σ)
for any path σ ∈ PathsM .
In the worst case, determinization may yield an ex-
ponential increase in the size of the HMLR specification.
However, this happens on pathological examples of reg-
ular formulas, which rarely occur in practice; most of
the time, the nondeterminism contained in a formula
β is caused by a lack of precision regarding the itera-
tion operators, which can be corrected by constraining
the action formulas corresponding to iteration “exits”.
For example, the regular formula contained in Ψ1 can
be made deterministic by specifying precisely that the
occurrences of the head action are separated by actions
other than head and by taking into account that, in the
PTS of Figure 2(a), a dice action cannot occur before
a head : ((¬head)∗.head)∗.dice4. In practice, the size of
the determinized HMLR specification can be reduced by
eliminating duplicate equations and by identifying con-
tradictory combinations and absorptions of action for-
mulas (α1 ∧ α2 = false and α1 ∧ ¬α2 = α1 when α1, α2
are disjoint).
5. Translation to linear and Boolean equation systems.
Consider a determinized HMLR specification in RNF (in
which the meta-variables have been renamed into ordi-
nary propositional variables) corresponding to a regular
formula β:
{
Xi =
∨ni
j=1(ϕij ∧ 〈αij〉Xij) ∨ ϕi
}
1≤i≤n
where αij∧αik = false for each i ∈ [1, n] and j, k ∈ [1, ni]
with j 6= k. The associated path predicates are defined
as follows:

Pi(σ) =
∨ni
j=1(σ[0] |= ϕij ∧ σa[0] |= αij ∧
Pij(σ1))
∨
σ[0] |= ϕi

1≤i≤n
They are related to the HMLR specification by (µΦ)i =
{s ∈ S | ∃σ ∈ PathsM (s).Pi(σ)}, and to the initial regu-
lar formula β by P1(σ) = σ |= β.
The last step of the model checking method reformu-
lates the problem of verifying the determinized HMLR
specification on a PTS in terms of solving a LES (∗) and
a BES (∗∗) defined as follows:
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Zi,s = if s 6|= Xi then 0
else if s |= ϕi then 1
else
ni∑
j=1
if s 6|= ϕij then 0
else∑
s
a→ s′
a |= αij
P(s, a, s′) · Zij,s′
1 ≤ i ≤ n
s ∈ S
(∗)

Xi,s =
∨ni
j=1
(
s |= ϕij ∧∨
s
a→s′
(
a |= αij ∧Xij,s′
))
∨
s |= ϕi

1 ≤ i ≤ n
s ∈ S
(∗∗)
The LES (∗) is obtained by a translation similar to
the classical one defined originally for PCTL [29]. A nu-
merical variable Zi,s denotes the probability measure of
the paths going out of state s and satisfying the path
predicate Pi. The BES (∗∗), with minimal fixed point
semantics, is produced by the classical translation em-
ployed for model checking modal µ-calculus formulas on
LTSs [16,3]. A Boolean variable Xi,s is true iff state
s satisfies the propositional variable Xi of the HMLR
specification. The on-the-fly model checking consists in
solving the variable Z1,si , which denotes the probabil-
ity measure of the set of paths going out of the initial
state si of the PTS and satisfying the initial regular for-
mula β. This is carried out using local LES and BES
resolution algorithms, as will be explained in Section 5.
The conditions s |= Xi occurring in the LES (∗) and the
conditions s |= ϕij , s |= ϕi occurring in both equation
systems are checked by applying the on-the-fly model
checking method for solving the variable Xsi of the BES
(∗∗) and for evaluating the closed state formulas ϕij , ϕi
on state s.
The determinization of the HMLR specification guar-
antees that the sum of coefficients in the right hand side
of each equation of the LES is at most 1. If the HMLR
specification is not determinized, such as the one shown
in Figure 3(c), the LES encoding the interpretation of
the formula on the PTS in Figure 3(a) has the wrong
solution Z1,0 = 2.0 (variable Z1,2 = 0 since s2 6|= X1,
and variables Z2,1 = Z2,2 = 1 since X2 = true). This
is because the nondeterministic equation defining X1 in
the HMLR specification matches twice the suffix of the
path going out of s0. Note that determinization ensures
a sound LES translation also if some states have several
outgoing transitions labeled by the same action a.
The condition s 6|= Xi surrounded in the LES (*)
has the role of pruning the exploration of the PTS if the
current state s does not have any outgoing path match-
ing the suffix of β denoted by Xi. As explained in [7,
Chap. 10], this is necessary to avoid singularities in the
a 1.0 a 1.0
b 1.0
s0 s1 s2
{
X1 = 〈a〉X2 ∨ 〈true〉X1
X2 = true
}
(a) PTS (c) guarded HMLR
{true∗.a}≥0
{
Z1,0 = 1.0 · Z2,1 + 1.0 · Z1,1
Z1,1 = 1.0 · Z2,2 + 1.0 · Z1,2
}
(b) formula (d) LES
Fig. 3: Nondeterministic regular formula
a 0.5
s0 s1
c 1.0
b 0.5 {
X1 = 〈a〉X2 ∨ 〈¬a〉X1
X2 = true
}
(a) PTS (c) deterministic HMLR
{(¬a)∗.a}≥0
{
Z1,0 = 0.5 · Z2,0 + 0.5 · Z1,1
Z1,1 = 1.0 · Z1,1
}
(b) formula (d) LES
Fig. 4: Unreachable path suffix
LES and ensure a unique solution. For example, if we
neglect the condition s 6|= Xi when checking the deter-
ministic HMLR specification shown in Figure 4(c) on
the PTS shown in Figure 4(a), the resulting LES con-
tains the singular equation Z1,1 = Z1,1. This is precisely
because s1 6|= X1, meaning that from s1 there is no path
matching the regular formula suffix denoted by X1.
By solving the LES obtained in Figure 2(f), we ob-
tain Z1,0 = 1/6, meaning that tossing the head of the
coin an (arbitrarily large) number of times corresponds
to rolling the four-side of the dice with 1/6 probability,
and therefore the formula Ψ1 is valid on the PTS. The
numerical variables Z1,1, Z7,11, and Z7,12 surrounded by
boxes in Figure 2(f) are equal to 0, since the path suf-
fixes denoted by the propositional variables X1 and X7
are not reachable from states s1, s11, and s12 of the PTS;
this is checked by solving the Boolean variables X1,1,
X7,11, and X7,12 of the BES in Figure 2(g), which are
equal to false. If we evaluate the Ψ1 formula for every
dicei action, we obtain a probability equal to 1/6 for
i ∈ {1, 2, 4} and to 0 for i ∈ {3, 5, 6}, the latter sides of
the dice being not directly reachable after a head action.
4 Extension with data handling
The regular formulas that we used so far belong to the
dataless fragment [47] of MCL, which considers actions
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simply as names of communication channels. In practice,
the analysis of value-passing concurrent systems, whose
actions typically consist of channel names and data val-
ues, requires the ability to extract and manipulate these
elements. For this purpose, MCL [48] provides action
predicates extracting and/or matching data values, regu-
lar formulas involving data variables, and parameterized
fixed point operators. The regular probabilistic operator
{β}≥p can be naturally extended with the data handling
regular formulas of MCL, which enable to characterize
complex paths in a PTS modeling a value-passing con-
current system.
To improve versatility, we extend the regular formu-
las of MCL with a general iteration operator “loop”,
which subsumes the classical regular operators with
counters, and can also specify paths having a certain
cost calculated from the data values carried by its ac-
tions. After briefly recalling the main data handling op-
erators of MCL, we define the “loop” operator, illustrate
its expressiveness, and show how the on-the-fly model
checking procedure previously described is generalized
to deal with the data handling probabilistic operator.
4.1 Overview of data handling MCL operators
In the PTSs modeling value-passing systems, actions are
of the form “c v1 . . . vn”, where c is a channel name and
v1, ..., vn are the data values exchanged during the ren-
dezvous on c. To handle the data values contained in
actions, MCL provides several basic constructs, defined
in Figure 5. Data expressions e are built over data vari-
ables x and functions f (restricted, for simplicity, to a
single argument in Fig. 5). The interpretation of e is de-
fined w.r.t. a data context δ assigning values to all data
variables occurring in e.
Actions containing data are specified using action
predicates of the form “{c !e}” (value matching) or
“{c ?x:T}” (value extraction). The former predicate
matches an action c v with v equal to the value of e,
whereas the latter predicate also captures the value v
(which must be of type T ) and stores it in the variable
x. The successful evaluation of a predicate “{c ?x:T}” on
an action a also produces a data context enva({c ?x:T})
where x is assigned the value extracted from a. The ac-
tion predicates of MCL are slightly more involved than
those shown in Figure 5: several clauses “!e” and “?x:T”
can be freely combined (the variables defined in the ex-
traction clauses are visible inside the action predicate
and also in the enclosing formula), the “...” wildcard
can be used to match zero or more values, and an op-
tional clause “where b” can be used to specify a Boolean
condition b over the extracted variables. An action sat-
isfies an action predicate if its structure is compatible
with the clauses of the predicate and the “where” guard
(if present) evaluates to true in the context of the data
variables extracted from that action.
Expressions:
e ::= x | f(e)
[[x]] δ = δ(x)
[[f(e)]] δ = f([[e]] δ)
Action patterns:
α ::= {c !e} | {c ?x:T}
[[{c !e}]] δ = {c [[e]] δ}
[[{c ?x:T}]] δ = {c v | v ∈ T}
envc v({c ?x:T}) = [v/x] if v ∈ T
enva(α) = [ ] otherwise
State formulas:
ϕ ::= 〈α〉ϕ | Y (e) | µY (x:T :=e).ϕ
[[〈α〉ϕ]] ρδ = {s ∈ S | ∃s a→ s′.a ∈ [[α]] δ ∧
s′ ∈ [[ϕ]] ρ(δ  enva(α))}
[[Y (e)]] ρδ = ρ(Y )([[e]] δ)
[[µY (x:T :=e).ϕ]] ρδ = µΦρδ([[e]] δ)
where Φρδ : (T → 2S)→ (T → 2S),
(Φρδ(F ))(v) = [[ϕ]] (ρ [F/Y ])(δ  [v/x])
Fig. 5: Syntax and semantics of basic MCL operators
The basic state formulas of MCL are built from
Boolean connectors, modalities, and parameterized fixed
point operators (restricted, for simplicity, to a single pa-
rameter in Fig. 5). A fixed point formula µY (x:T :=e).ϕ
denotes both the definition and the call in situ of a
propositional variable Y parameterized by x. Its inter-
pretation w.r.t. a propositional context ρ and a data con-
text δ is the call of µΦρδ with the value of e in the con-
text δ, µΦρδ being the minimal solution of the equation
Y (x) = ϕ interpreted w.r.t. the contexts ρ and δ.
Regular formulas in MCL are built over action pred-
icates using the classical operators shown in Section 2,
as well as constructs inspired from sequential program-
ming languages: conditional (“if-then-else”), counting, it-
eration (“for” and “loop”, described in Subsection 4.2),
and definition of variables (“let”). Finally, the state for-
mulas of MCL also provide modalities containing regular
formulas, quantifiers over finite domains, and program-
ming language constructs (“if” and “let”) [48].
4.2 Generalized iteration on regular formulas
The general iteration mechanism that we propose on reg-
ular formulas consists of three operators having the fol-
lowing syntax:
β ::= loop (x:T :=e0) : (x
′:T ′) in
β
end loop
| continue (e)
| exit (e′)
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The “loop” operator denotes a path made by concate-
nation of (zero or more) path fragments satisfying β,
each one corresponding to an iteration of the loop with
the current value of variable x. The iteration variable x,
which is visible inside the loop body β, is initialized with
the value of expression e0 at the first loop iteration and
can be updated to the value of e by using the operator
“continue (e)”, which starts a new iteration of the loop.
The loop is terminated by means of the “exit (e′)” op-
erator, which sets the return variable x′, visible outside
the “loop” formula, to the value of e′.
The iteration and return variables (x and x′) are both
optional; if they are absent, the “in” keyword is also
omitted. For simplicity, we used only one variable x and
x′, but several variables of each kind are allowed. The ar-
guments of the operators “continue” and “exit” invoked
in the loop body β must be compatible with the dec-
larations of iteration and return variables, respectively.
Every occurrence of “continue” and “exit” refers to the
immediately enclosing “loop”, which enforces a specifi-
cation style similar to structured programming.
For conciseness, we define the semantics of the “loop”
operator by translating it to basic MCL in the context
of an enclosing diamond modality (a dual translation
holds for an enclosing box modality). The translation
loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(ϕ) is defined in Figure 6, where x
and x′ are the iteration and return data variables of the
immediately enclosing “loop”, and Z is the propositional
variable associated to it. Basically, a possibility modality
enclosing a “loop” operator is translated into a minimal
fixed point operator parameterized by the iteration vari-
able(s). The occurrences of “continue” in the body of the
loop are translated into calls of the propositional vari-
able with the corresponding arguments, and the occur-
rences of “exit” are translated into “let” state formulas
defining the return variables and assigning them the cor-
responding return values. The rules for the other regular
operators generalize those of the translation from PDL
to modal µ-calculus [22].
All iteration operators on MCL regular formulas can
be expressed in terms of the “loop” operator, as shown in
Table 1. For simplicity, we omitted the definition of β∗,
β+, β{e} (iteration e times), and β{... e} (iteration at
most e times), which are equivalent to β{0 ...}, β{1 ...},
β{e ... e}, and β{0 ... e}, respectively.
To illustrate the semantics of general iteration, con-
sider the formula 〈β{e}〉 true stating the existence of a
path made of e path fragments satisfying β. By encoding
bounded iteration as a “loop” and applying the transla-
tion rules of general iteration, we obtain:
Table 1: Encoding MCL iteration operators using “loop”
Syntax Meaning Encoding using “loop”
β{e ...} ≥ e times loop (c:nat := e) in
if c > 0 then
β . continue (c− 1)
else
exit | β . continue (c)
end if
end loop
β{e1 ... e2} between loop (c1:nat := e1,
e1 and e2 c2:nat := e2 − e1)
times in
if c1 > 0 then
β . continue (c1 − 1, c2)
elsif c2 > 0 then
exit |
β . continue (c1, c2 − 1)
else
exit
end if
end loop
for n:nat stepwise loop (n:nat := e1) in
from e1 if n < e2 then
to e2 β . continue (n+ e3)
step e3 else
do exit
β end if
end for end loop
〈β{e}〉 true =
〈
loop (c:nat := e) in
if c > 0 then
β . continue (c− 1)
else
exit
end if
end loop
〉
true
=
µZ(c:nat := e).
if c > 0 then
〈β〉Z(c− 1)
else
true
end if
The bounded iteration operators β{e}, β{e ...}, and
β{e1 ... e2} are natural means for counting actions
(ticks), and hence describing discrete-time properties.
The full Until operator of PCTL, and its action-based
counterparts derived from ACTL, can be expressed as
follows (where t ≥ 0 is the number of ticks until ϕ2):[
ϕ1 U
≤t ϕ2
]
≥p = {(ϕ1?.true){0 ... t}.ϕ2?}≥p[
ϕ1α1 U
≤t ϕ2
]
≥p = {(ϕ1?.α1){0 ... t}.ϕ2?}≥p[
ϕ1α1 U
≤t
α2 ϕ2
]
≥p = {(ϕ1?.α1){0 ... t}.ϕ1?.α2.ϕ2?}≥p
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loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′
〈 loop (x:T :=e0) : (x′:T ′) inβ
end loop
〉
ϕ
 def= µY (x:T :=e0).loop2mclY/x:T/x′:T ′(〈β〉ϕ)
loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′ (〈continue (e)〉ϕ) def= Z(e)
loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′ (〈exit (e′)〉ϕ) def= let x′:T ′ := e′ in loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(ϕ) end let
loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(〈α〉ϕ) def= 〈α〉 loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(ϕ)
loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(〈ϕ1?〉ϕ) def= 〈loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(ϕ1)?〉 loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(ϕ)
loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(〈β1|β2〉ϕ) def= loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(〈β1〉ϕ) ∨ loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(〈β2〉ϕ)
loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(〈β1.β2〉ϕ) def= loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(〈β1〉 loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(〈β2〉ϕ))
loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(〈β∗〉ϕ) def= µY.(loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(ϕ) ∨ loop2mclZ/x:T/x′:T ′(〈β〉Y ))
Fig. 6: Translation of the general iteration operators in basic MCL
Besides counting, the “loop” operator can characterize
complex paths in a PTS, by collecting the data values
(costs) present on actions and using them in arbitrary
computations, as it will be illustrated in Section 6.
4.3 Model checking method with data handling
The on-the-fly model checking method described in Sec-
tion 3 can be generalized to deal with the data handling
constructs of MCL by adding data parameters to the
various equation systems used as intermediate forms.
We illustrate the complete method on a data han-
dling version of the PTS modeling the six-sided dice us-
ing a fair coin, shown on Figure 7(a). The actions of toss-
ing the head and tail of the coin are denoted by “toss 1”
and “toss 0”, and the actions corresponding to the dice
faces are denoted by “dice i” for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. We will check
on this PTS the formula Ψ2, stating that the probability
of reaching the dice side marked with one by tossing first
a side of the coin and then tossing the same side at most
n times (where n is a parameter to be instantiated) is at
least 10%:
Ψ2 = { {toss ?v:nat}.
((¬{toss !v})∗.{toss !v}){... n}.
{dice !1} }≥0.1
The various translation phases are illustrated on Fig-
ure 7. The translation rules for standard regular op-
erators given in Section 3, extended with data han-
dling, are applied for eliminating the “.” operators in
the PDLR specification. To facilitate the subsequent
model checking steps, the new equations introduced by
these rules are data-closed, i.e., the propositional vari-
ables in their left hand sides are parameterized by the
data variables occurring in their right hand side formu-
las. For example, when translating the right hand side
of the equation defining X1, the extended rule applied
is 〈{toss ?v:nat}.β〉X2 = 〈{toss ?v:nat}〉X3(v), where
X3(v) = 〈β〉X2, ensuring that data variable v occurring
in β is a parameter of X3. Then, the iteration at most n
times is translated into a “loop” operator, and the corre-
sponding modality is further refined using the semantics
of “loop” defined in Section 4.2, yielding a HMLR speci-
fication parameterized by a counter c and by the value v
of the coin side captured by the first action of the regular
formula (Fig. 7(c)).
This HMLR specification is then brought to guarded
form (Fig. 7(d)) by carrying out systematically the ap-
propriate substitutions and keeping track of the data
parameters. For example, variable X3(v) is replaced
by X5(v, n) in the equation of X1, and X6(v, c) is re-
placed by 〈{toss !v}〉X5(v, c−1) in the equation defining
X7(v, c).
The guarded HMLR specification is deter-
minized by ensuring that the alternatives in the
right hand side of equation defining X5(v, c) are
mutually exclusive (all the other equations being
already deterministic). This produces the alter-
natives 〈{dice !1} ∧ ¬{toss !v}〉 {X2, X7(v, c)} and
〈¬{toss !v} ∧ ¬{dice !1}〉 {X7(v, c)}. The former al-
ternative is equivalent to 〈{dice !1}〉 {X2} because
{dice !1} ⇒ ¬{toss !v} and X2 denotes the final states
of the paths satisfying the initial regular formula.
The other alternatives present in the equations led to
singleton meta-variables, which are replaced by the
variables themselves (Fig. 7(e)).
Next, a parameterized LES is produced (Fig. 7(f)) by
the translation scheme given in Section 3, extended to
handle data parameters. For instance, variable Z5,1(1, n)
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in the LES denotes the probability measure of the paths
starting from state s1 and satisfying the path predicate
denoted by X5 with the parameters v and c set to 1 and
n, respectively. The numerical variables Z5,2(0, n) and
Z7,4(1, c) surrounded by boxes in Figure 7(f) are equal
to 0, since the path suffixes denoted by the propositional
variables X5(0, n) and X7(1, c) are not reachable from
states s2 and s4 of the PTS (this is checked by solving the
corresponding Boolean variables of the BES, not shown
in Figure 7).
Finally, a plain LES is generated (Fig. 7(g)) by in-
stantiating n = 2 in the parameterized LES. By solving
this LES (e.g., using substitution), we obtain Z1,0 =
0.125, which is the probability measure of the paths
starting from the initial state s0 of the PTS and satisfy-
ing the regular formula specified in Ψ2. In other words,
tossing first a side of the coin, then tossing again the
same side at most n = 2 times corresponds with 12.5%
probability to rolling the one-side of the dice, and there-
fore the Ψ2 formula is valid on the PTS in Figure 7(a).
If we evaluate the Ψ2 formula with n = 2 for every ac-
tion “dice i”, we obtain a probability equal to 0.125 for
i ∈ {1, 6}, to 0.156 for i ∈ {2, 5}, and to 0 for i ∈ {3, 4},
the latter sides of the dice being not reachable after toss-
ing once, then at most n = 2 times the same side of the
coin.
4.4 Soundness and termination of the method
The presence of data parameters (with infinite domains)
in the regular formulas β makes necessary two addi-
tional hypotheses about the structure of β in order to
ensure the feasibility of our model checking method for
the probabilistic operator {β}≥p.
Soundness of the translation to guarded form. The
translation of (parameterized) HMLR specifications to
guarded form relies on the absorption property for µ-
calculus formulas with data parameters:
µX(u).(X(u) ∨ ϕ) = µX(u).ϕ
where ϕ may contain occurrences of the propositional
variable X with arbitrary data arguments. The above
equality does not hold anymore if the unguarded oc-
currence of X in the left hand side has an argument e
different from the parameter u. Typically, such cases cor-
respond to regular formulas that perform pure compu-
tations on data without exploring any transition in the
PTS. For example, the following regular modality spec-
ifies the classical primality testing of a natural number
n (odd and greater than 3) by checking that n is not
divided by any of the odd numbers from 3 to
√
n:
〈 loop (k:nat:=3) : (r:bool) in
if k ∗ k > n then
exit (true)
elsif n%k = 0 then
exit (false)
else
continue (k + 2)
end if
end loop 〉 r
The corresponding HMLR specification, shown below,
contains the unguarded occurrence X2(k+2), which can-
not be eliminated by absorption:
X1 = X2(3)
X2(k) = if k ∗ k > n then
true
elsif n%k = 0 then
false
else
X2(k + 2)
end if

In practice, we forbid such kind of regular formulas
purely operating on data, since they can be replaced by
functions, and we reserve regular formulas for the spec-
ification of (non empty) paths in the PTS.
Termination of the LES and BES construction. After
translating the regular formula into a (parameterized)
deterministic HMLR specification, the last phase of the
model checking procedure consists in generating and
solving on the fly the LES and BES. These systems de-
pend not only on the (finite) information contained in
the PTS, but also on the values of the data parame-
ters (with infinite domains) created during instantiation.
Therefore, the convergence of the whole procedure re-
lies on the termination of the instantiation phase, which
must create finite LES and BES. This is in general un-
decidable, similarly to the termination of term rewrit-
ing [19]. Typically, such situations happen for “patholog-
ical” formulas, which carry on divergent computations
unrelated to the data values contained in the PTS ac-
tions. For example, the following modality:
〈 loop (k:nat:=0) in
a . continue (k + 1)
end loop 〉 true
will not converge on the PTS consisting of a single loop
s
a 1.0→ s, since it will entail the construction of an infinite
LES {Zs(0) = Zs(1), Zs(1) = Zs(2), ...}. In practice,
for such divergent formulas, the instantiation phase will
attempt to generate an infinite LES, eventually causing
the whole model checking procedure to abort when the
available memory is exhausted.
The regular formulas β used in the probabilistic op-
erator are meant to characterize finite paths in the PTS.
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s0
s3 s4 s5 s6
s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12
toss 0 0.5toss 1 0.5
dice 2 1.0 dice 5 1.0 dice 6 1.0dice 1 1.0 dice 3 1.0 dice 4 1.0
toss 1 0.5 toss 0 0.5
toss 1 0.5
toss 0 0.5
toss 1 0.5
s2s1
toss 1 0.5
toss 1 0.5
toss 0 0.5
toss 0 0.5toss 1 0.5
toss 0 0.5
toss 0 0.5
(a) PTS (data handling version)
X1 = 〈{toss ?v:nat}.
((¬{toss !v})∗.
{toss !v}){... n}.
{dice !1}〉X2
X2 = true


X1 = 〈{toss ?v:nat}〉X3(v)
X2 = true
X3(v) = 〈nil〉X5(v, n)
X4 = 〈{dice !1}〉X2
X5(v, c) = if c > 0 then
〈nil〉X4 ∨
〈nil〉X7(v, c)
else
〈nil〉X4
end if
X6(v, c) = 〈{toss !v}〉X5(v, c− 1)
X7(v, c) = 〈nil〉X6(v, c) ∨
〈¬{toss !v}〉X7(v, c)


X1 = 〈{toss ?v:nat}〉X5(v, n)
X2 = true
X5(v, c) = if c > 0 then
〈{dice !1}〉X2 ∨
〈{toss !v}〉X5(v, c− 1) ∨
〈¬{toss !v}〉X7(v, c)
else
〈{dice !1}〉X2
end if
X7(v, c) = 〈{toss !v}〉X5(v, c− 1) ∨
〈¬{toss !v}〉X7(v, c)

(b) PDLR (c) HMLR (d) guarded HMLR

X1 = 〈{toss ?v:nat}〉X5(v, n)
X2 = true
X5(v, c) = if c > 0 then
〈{dice !1}〉X2 ∨
〈{toss !v}〉X5(v, c− 1) ∨
〈¬{toss !v} ∧
¬{dice !1}〉X7(v, c)
else
〈{dice !1}〉X2
end if
X7(v, c) = 〈{toss !v}〉X5(v, c− 1) ∨
〈¬{toss !v}〉X7(v, c)


Z1,0 = 0.5 · Z5,1(1, n) +
0.5 · Z5,2(0, n)
Z5,1(1, c) = if c > 0 then
0.5 · Z5,3(1, c− 1) +
0.5 · Z7,4(1, c)
else
0
end if
Z5,3(1, c) = if c > 0 then
0.5 · Z5,7(1, c− 1) +
0.5 · Z7,1(1, c)
else
0
end if
Z5,7(1, c) = if c > 0 then 1
else 1 end if
Z7,1(1, c) = 0.5 · Z5,3(1, c− 1) +
0.5 · Z7,4(1, c)


Z1,0 = 0.5 · Z5,1(1, 2)
Z5,1(1, 2) = 0.5 · Z5,3(1, 1)
Z5,3(1, 1) = 0.5 + 0.5 · Z5,3(1, 0)
Z5,3(1, 0) = 0

(e) deterministic HMLR (f) LES (partially instantiated) (g) LES (instantiated for n = 2)
Fig. 7: Model checking formula Ψ2 = {{toss ?v:nat}.((¬{toss !v})∗.{toss !v}){... n}.{dice !1}}≥0.1 on a PTS
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Ensuring this becomes undecidable in the presence of the
generalized iteration operator “loop”, which enables the
specification of arbitrary (Turing computable) paths in
a PTS. However, the model checking procedure termi-
nates for most practical cases of data handling regular
formulas denoting finite paths (counting, accumulating
or aggregating values, computing costs over paths).
5 Tool support
We implemented the on-the-fly model checking method
described in Sections 3 and 4 within the CADP tool-
box [27]. We briefly present here the extension of the ex-
isting on-the-fly model checker of MCL with the regular
probabilistic operator, and the representations of PTS
and DTMC models suitable for probabilistic analysis.
Extension of MCL and its model checker. We extended
MCL with the general iteration operator “loop” on
regular formulas and the regular probabilistic opera-
tor {β}./ p, where ./ ∈ {<,≤, >,≥,=}. Temporal and
probabilistic operators can be freely combined, e.g.,
[β1] {β2}≥p specifies that, from all states reached after
a path satisfying β1, the probability measure of an out-
going path satisfying β2 is at least p. Also, using the
MCL quantifiers on finite data domains, one can suc-
cinctly describe data handling probabilistic properties,
such as the fact that after zero or more coin tosses,
each side of the dice is reached with 1/6 probability:
forall i:nat among {1...6}.{ {toss ...}∗.{dice !i} }≥1/6.
We also enhanced the EVALUATOR [48] on-the-fly
model checker with the translation of {β}./ p formulas
into BESs (for checking the existence of path suffixes)
and LESs (for computing probability measures) as de-
scribed in Sections 3 and 4. The on-the-fly resolution
of BESs is carried out by the algorithms of the CAE-
SAR SOLVE library [43], which already serves as veri-
fication back-end for (non-probabilistic) MCL formulas.
The resolution algorithms work in a systolic manner: sev-
eral subsequent invocations of an algorithm for solving
different variables of a BES have a linear overall com-
plexity in the size of the BES (number of variables and
operators), obtained by keeping the values of all vari-
ables computed during intermediate resolutions.
For the on-the-fly resolution of LESs, we designed
a local algorithm operating on the associated Signal
Flow Graphs (SFG) [12], in a way similar to the BES
resolution algorithms, which operate on the associated
Boolean graphs [3]. Figure 8 illustrates the SFG of the
LES corresponding to the evaluation of property Ψ1 on
the PTS of the six-sided dice, shown in Figure 2(f). In
the SFG, each vertex corresponds to a variable of the
LES and each edge Zi,s
q→ Zj,r denotes a dependency
of Zi,s upon Zj,r, i.e., the fact that the term q · Zj,r oc-
curs in the right hand side of the equation defining Zi,s
(e.g., edges Z1,0
0.5→ Z1,1 and Z1,0 0.5→ Z7,2 represent the
equation Z1,0 = 0.5 ·Z1,1+0.5 ·Z7,2). Constants are rep-
resented as sink vertices (e.g., Z1,1 or Z1,10). Self-loops
Zi,s
q→ Zi,s are deleted during the construction of the
SFG by updating the coefficients on the edges going out
of Zi,s (an edge Zi,s
qij→ Zj,r becomes Zi,s qij/(1−q)→ Zj,r).
The on-the-fly LES resolution algorithm carries out
a forward DFS (depth-first search) exploration of the
SFG with detection of SCCs (strongly connected com-
ponents), starting at the vertex of interest. The SFG is
constructed on demand in the following way. For each
vertex Zi,s, the BES solver is invoked on the Boolean
variable Xi,s to determine whether s has an outgoing
sequence matching the suffix of the regular formula β
denoted by the propositional variable Xi of the deter-
minized HMLR specification (see Fig. 2(e)). If variable
Xi,s is false, the vertex Zi,s denotes a constant 0, like the
boxed vertices Z1,1, Z7,11, and Z7,12 in Figure 8. When
a constant vertex Zj,r is encountered, its value is prop-
agated backwards to its predecessor vertex Zi,s on the
DFS stack, which amounts to perform the substitution
of Zj,r in the right-hand side of the equation defining
Zi,s. If the vertex Zi,s on top of the stack becomes sta-
ble (i.e., the values of all its successor vertices have been
computed), its value is stored for possible later reuse and
is propagated backwards as if Zi,s was a constant.
If variable Xi,s is true, then the SFG edges going out
of Zi,s are constructed by scanning the right hand side of
the corresponding equation in the LES, and the DFS ex-
ploration can proceed further. When a non-trivial SCC
(i.e., containing at least two vertices) is encountered,
the corresponding LES fragment induced by the vertices
of the SCC is solved using either Gaussian elimination
(for LES fragments with less than 1, 000 variables) or
the Gauss-Seidel iterative method (for larger LES frag-
ments). For the SFG in Figure 8, the DFS traversal will
propagate backwards the values of vertices Z1,1, Z1,10,
and Z7,11, stabilizing the vertex Z1,5 at 0.5. Then, af-
ter propagating backwards the vertex Z7,12, the SCC
{Z7,6, Z1,2} is detected and solved, stabilizing the ver-
tices Z7,6 and Z1,2 at 1/6 and 1/3, respectively. Finally,
vertex Z7,6 is propagated and stabilizes vertex Z7,2 at
1/3, and then the vertex of interest Z1,0 at 1/6.
For the acyclic parts of the SFG, this algorithm
amounts to a resolution by substitution, and stores
in memory only the vertices (corresponding to LES
variables). For each non-trivial SCC, the algorithm
stores the vertices and the edges (corresponding to the
operands in the right-hand sides of the LES equations)
until the SCC has been solved. Therefore, the peak mem-
ory consumption is determined by the largest SCC con-
tained in the SFG. In practice, it is often the case that
the evaluation of probabilistic operators on PTSs pro-
duces LESs with SFGs that are not strongly connected
(this is the case, e.g., for the SFG in Figure 8 and also
for all properties shown in Section 6). In these situa-
tions, the SFG-based on-the-fly LES resolution can be
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Fig. 8: Signal Flow Graph of the LES in Figure 2(f)
less memory consuming than a global resolution work-
ing on the entirely constructed LES.
Representation of PTSs. The concurrent systems under
analysis in CADP are described formally using the LNT
language [11], inspired from value-passing process alge-
bras and classical programming languages. An LNT de-
scription is compiled into an LTS represented implic-
itly as a C program implementing the successor function
according to the OPEN/CAESAR application program-
ming interface [25] for on-the-fly graph exploration. This
LTS is converted on the fly into a PTS by adding prob-
abilities to its actions (transition labels) using the label
renaming feature of EVALUATOR. By default, all tran-
sitions going out of a state are equiprobable, in which
case there is no need to specify any probability distri-
bution (this happens, e.g., for the PTSs modeling the
dice, shown in Fig. 2(a) and 7(a)). If one assigns a spe-
cific probability p to some action a, then for each state
s having an outgoing transition s
a→ s′, the remaining
probability 1 − p is equally distributed on the actions
labeling the neighbour transitions s
b→ s′. In this way,
an LNT description can be converted on the fly (with-
out any additional annotation) into a PTS during the
verification of a probabilistic MCL formula.
Representation of DTMCs. Although the modeling and
verification approach of CADP is action-based, the un-
derlying models can be adapted to accomodate for state-
based analysis, by encoding the relevant information on
actions instead of states. Thus, a DTMC having atomic
propositions on states can be converted into a PTS by
“pushing” all state information on the actions labeling
the outgoing transitions. For example, if a set of atomic
propositions q1, ..., qn hold on a state s of a DTMC,
then the transitions going out of s in the corresponding
PTS will be labeled by actions of the form “A q1 . . . qn”
and will keep the same probabilities as in the DTMC.
This scheme, which does not change the structure of the
graph, relies on the data handling modalities of MCL
for expressing atomic propositions on states: a state sat-
isfying qi in the DTMC satisfies the diamond modality
〈{A ?any ... ?any !qi ...}〉 true in the PTS, where “?any”
is a wildcard matching a value of any type. Using the
macro-definition mechanism of MCL, the atomic propo-
sitions can be encoded as macros with symbolic names
and reused in state-based formulas.
In this way, one can check state-based proper-
ties using the PCTL operators encoded in terms of
{β}≥p as shown in Section 4.2. Moreover, the reg-
ular operators of MCL enable one to specify prop-
erties more expressive than Until operators, such as
{send?.true.(retry?.true∗)∗.recv?}≥0.9, where the atomic
propositions like send are macro-definition names for
the modalities 〈{A !send}〉 true and they are checked on
states using the testing operator “?” of PDL.
6 Case studies
We illustrate the application of the regular probabilis-
tic operator by carrying out a probabilistic analysis of
several concurrent systems. First, we consider several
shared-memory mutual exclusion protocols (Sec. 6.1),
and corroborate the results of the probabilistic analysis
with those previously obtained by a steady-state analy-
sis using CTMCs in [46]. Then, we compare our on-the-
fly model checker procedure with the explicit-state algo-
rithms of the probabilistic model checker PRISM [36],
by analyzing the Bounded Retransmission Protocol
(Sec. 6.2) and two randomized protocols (Sec. 6.3). All
model checking experiments have been carried out on a
single core of an Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2630v3 @2.4GHz
with 128 GBytes of RAM and Linux Debian 7.9 within
a cluster of Grid’5000 [9].
We considered the explicit-state engine of PRISM in
order to achieve a consistent comparison with our on-
the-fly verification algorithms, which operate on explicit-
state PTSs; however, some of the performance figures re-
ported below (e.g., in Sec. 6.2) are close to those of the
PRISM benchmarks1, which were conducted using the
symbolic engine of PRISM. The time and memory con-
sumption measured for the two tools include the time of
constructing the model (i.e., launching the Java virtual
machine and building the DTMC by PRISM, compil-
ing the LNT description and converting the state space
on the fly into a PTS by CADP). Given that PRISM
and CADP are very different in their architecture, algo-
rithms, and implementation, the experimental measures
presented in this section are not meant to provide an
absolutely precise comparison of the tools performance,
but rather to give general tendencies for various sizes of
the models considered.
1 http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/
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6.1 Mutual exclusion protocols
We focus here on a subset of the 27 protocols speci-
fied in LNT and studied in [46], namely the CLH, MCS,
Burns&Lynch (BL), Lamport, Peterson, TAS and TTAS
protocols, by considering configurations of N ≤ 5 con-
current processes competing to access the critical sec-
tion. Each process executes cyclically a sequence of four
sections: non critical, entry, critical, and exit. The en-
try and exit sections represent the algorithm specific to
each protocol for demanding and releasing the access to
the critical section, respectively. During these sections,
each protocol carries out various operations (read, write,
test-and-set, etc.) on the shared variables.
In the PTS models of the protocols, all transitions
going out of each state have equal probabilities, mean-
ing that each process has the same chances to execute.
This kind of analysis by introducing probabilities may
seem artificial in the case of mutual exclusion protocols.
However, it provides a simple way to compare the per-
formance of different protocols by estimating their re-
spective “speed” in reaching certain actions, and also
enabling to simulate particular situations of system load
(e.g., for the contention property studied at the end of
this section) by varying the probabilities assigned to the
actions of certain processes. We found that this prob-
abilistic analysis corroborates, and also complements,
a stochastic analysis using IMCs (Interactive Markov
Chains) previously carried out in [46].
We formulate four probabilistic properties using
MCL and evaluate them on the fly on each LNT pro-
tocol description. Since we are interested in the proba-
bility measures, we use the syntax {β}./ ? p instructing
the model checker to display the probability measure
computed for β in addition to the Boolean verdict. For
each property requiring several invocations of the model
checker with different values for the data parameters in
the MCL formula, we automate the analysis using SVL
scripts [26].
Critical section. First of all, for each i ∈ [0, N − 1], we
compute the probability that process Pi is the first one
to enter its critical section. For this purpose, we use the
following MCL formula:
{ (¬{CS !”ENTER”...})∗.{CS !”ENTER” !i} }≥ ? 0
which computes the probability that, from the initial
state, process Pi accesses its critical section before any
(other) process. Symmetric protocols guarantee that this
probability is equal to 1/N for all processes, while asym-
metric protocols (such as BL) may favor certain pro-
cesses w.r.t. the others.
This is indeed reflected by checking the above for-
mula for N = 5: for the BL protocol, which gives higher
priority to processes of lower index, the probabilities
computed are 71.01% for P0, 21.33% for P1, 5.68% for
P2, 1.53% for P3, and 0.43% for P4, whereas they are
equal to 20% for all processes of the other, symmet-
ric, protocols. This corroborates the results obtained by
steady-state analysis using IMCs [46], which pointed out
the asymmetry of the BL protocol.
The SFGs of the LESs produced by EVALUATOR
when checking this formula are not strongly connected,
being even acyclic as e.g., the SFG obtained for the TAS
protocol.
Memory latency. The analysis of critical section reach-
ability can be refined by taking into account the cost of
memory accesses (e.g., read, write, test-and-set opera-
tions on shared variables) that a process Pi must perform
before entering its critical section. The protocol model-
ing provided in [46] also considers non-uniform memory
accesses, assuming that concurrent processes execute on
a cache-coherent multiprocessor architecture. The cost c
(or latency) of a memory access performed by Pi depends
on the placement of the memory in the hierarchy (local
caches, shared RAM, remote disks) and is represented
in the PTS by actions of the form “MU ... c i” [46].
The MCL formula below computes the probability
that a process Pi performs memory accesses of a total
cost max before entering its critical section. The regular
formula expresses that, after executing its non critical
section for the first time, process Pi begins its entry sec-
tion and, after a number of memory accesses, enters its
critical section:
{ (¬{NCS !i})∗.{NCS !i}.
loop (total cost :nat:=0) in
(¬({MU ... !i} ∨ {CS !”ENTER” !i}))∗.
if total cost < max then
{MU ... ?c:nat !i}.
continue (total cost + c)
else
exit
end if
end loop .
{CS !”ENTER” !i}
}≥ ? 0
The “loop” subformula denotes the entry section of Pi
and requires that it terminates when the cost of all mem-
ory accesses performed by Pi (accumulated in the itera-
tion variable total cost) exceeds a given value max. The
costs present on transitions are captured by the action
pattern “{MU ... ?c:nat !i}” and used in the “continue”
subformula to update the value of total cost. The other
processes can execute freely during the entry section of
Pi, in particular they can overtake Pi by accessing their
critical sections before it.
Figure 9(a) shows the probability of entering the crit-
ical section for various values of max. Since the entry
section contains waiting loops, the number of memory
accesses of Pi before entering its critical section is un-
bounded (and hence, also the cost max). However, the
probability that a process waits indefinitely before en-
tering its critical section tends to zero in long-term runs
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Fig. 9: Probabilities computed using on-the-fly model checking. (a) Accessing the critical section after memory
accesses of cost MAX. (b) Overtaking of Pi by Pj (Pj Pi) in the BL protocol. (c) Standalone execution of Pi. (d)
Execution of P2 (in Lamport’s protocol) for different degrees of contention from the other processes.
of starvation-free protocols. This explains the asymp-
totic probability 1.0 observed in Figure 9(a): a process
has better chances to reach its critical section when the
memory cost of its entry section increases. Moreover, the
variation of probabilities shown in Figure 9(a) provides a
comparison of the protocols w.r.t. the “speed” of reach-
ing the critical section: the CLH protocol has the fastest
increase of the probability, and therefore it uses most
efficiently its accesses to shared variables.
We can further refine the MCL formula above to in-
fer the steady-state behavior by imposing a number of
protocol executions before the entry section of Pi (i.e.,
start accumulating the memory access cost after the r-th
“NCS !i” action). For the TAS protocol, we observed a
convergence of the probability when r = 5 for values of
max between 5 (steady-state probability of 42.66%) and
30 (steady-state probability of 96.41%). The SFGs of the
LESs produced by EVALUATOR for this MCL formula
contain several SCCs, e.g., for the TAS protocol with 2
processes the SFG contains up to 32 SCCs, of which the
largest one has 9 variables and was solved in 7 iterations.
Other properties involving the memory latency can be
expressed similarly, e.g., compute the probability to en-
ter the critical section after executing an entry section
that maximizes the ratio of local versus remote memory
accesses.
Overtaking. Even if a mutual exclusion protocol is
starvation-free, a process Pi that begins its entry sec-
tion (and hence, starts requesting the access to the crit-
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ical section) may be overtaken one or several times by
another process Pj that accesses its own critical section
before Pi does so. A qualitative measure of a starvation-
free protocol is given by its overtaking degree, which is
the maximum number of overtakes per couple of pro-
cesses. This number should be as small as possible, and
may vary among process couples for asymmetric proto-
cols. A qualitative study of the overtaking degree was
carried out in [46] using MCL regular formulas with
counters. Here we use the same property in the prob-
abilistic setting, which enables to compute the proba-
bility that process Pj overtakes Pi a given number of
times. Figure 9(b) shows the results for the BL proto-
col, which outline its intrinsic asymmetry: lower index
processes, with higher priority, also have better chances
to overtake the other processes. The SFGs of the LESs
produced by EVALUATOR contain several SCCs, e.g.,
for the TAS protocol with 2 processes the SFG contains
up to 6 SCCs, of which the largest one has 5 variables
and was solved in 7 iterations.
Standalone execution. As opposed to overtaking, it is
also interesting to examine the dual situation, in which
a process Pi executes its cycle in standalone, i.e., with-
out any interference with the other processes. This was
explicitly formulated in [20] as the independent progress
requirement, which should be satisfied by any mutual ex-
clusion protocol. We can analyze this situation by com-
puting the probability measure of a complete execution
of process Pi without any other action being performed
meanwhile by other processes. The MCL formula below
specifies such kind of execution, where max denotes the
number of consecutive executions of Pi:
{ ((¬{CS ... ?j:nat where j 6= i})∗.{NCS !i}.
(¬{... ?j:nat where j 6= i})∗.{CS !”ENTER” !i}.
(¬{... ?j:nat where j 6= i})∗.{CS !”LEAVE” !i}
) {max} }≥ ? 0
Figure 9(c) shows that the probability of standalone ex-
ecution of Pi decreases with max, which reflects the
starvation-free nature of the protocols. The SFGs of the
LESs produced by EVALUATOR for this formula con-
tain several SCCs, e.g., for the TAS protocol with 2 pro-
cesses the SFG contains up to 27 SCCs, of which the
largest one has 5 variables and was solved in 7 itera-
tions.
Contention. The last property we consider regards the
access of a process Pi to its critical section when the
other processes attempt (with different probabilities) to
access their own critical sections. Lamport’s protocol [37]
was designed to ensure a fast access, consisting of only
a few operations on the shared variables, of a process
to its critical section when the other processes do not
attempt similar accesses. This was motivated by the ob-
servation that contention of accesses to critical sections is
a rare phenomenon in well-designed concurrent systems.
We consider the same MCL formula used for analyzing
the memory latency, and evaluate it for the process P2
in Lamport’s protocol with N = 3 in presence of dif-
ferent degrees of contention, modeled by assigning on
the fly different probabilities to the memory operations
performed by the other processes P0 and P1.
The results are shown in Figure 9(d), where the curve
marked with a ’-’ represents the normal situation (all
processes compete for the critical section with equal
probabilities). The plots confirm the characteristic of the
fast access protocol: for low contention (1%) from the
other processes, P2 reaches its critical section with al-
most 100% probability after a small amount of memory
operations, whereas this probability decreases for higher
degrees of contention.
Performance of analysis. The sizes of the PTSs includ-
ing the additional transitions of memory access costs
(available in [46, Tab. 4]), range from 3 252 states and
6 444 transitions (for the TAS protocol) to 18 317 849
states and 31 849 616 transitions (for the CLH protocol).
The computing resources needed for on-the-fly veri-
fication depend on the complexity of the MCL regular
formulas, and in particular the number and domains of
their data parameters. For example, the analysis of the
first access to the critical section takes between 3.25-
5.5 seconds and 36.5-77 MBytes for all protocol config-
urations considered. For other properties, such as those
concerning the memory latency or the overtaking, some
peaks arrive up to 2-3 hours and 12-14 GBytes because
of the manipulation of data (cost of memory accesses)
and iterations (number of overtakes). The analysis of the
standalone execution of Pi may take up to 285 seconds
and 1 230 MBytes for the BL protocol because of the
complex cycles present in the PTS, while the same anal-
ysis takes less than 100 seconds (or even 10 seconds) for
the other protocols.
Analysis of peak cost paths. The combination of data
handling and probabilistic on-the-fly model checking us-
ing MCL enables the analysis of paths having peak cost
values in a PTS. Assuming that the paths of interest
are characterized by a regular formula β(cost) with a
parameter cost, two cases must be considered:
– If the paths of interest are finite, the peak value
of cost can be computed by checking the modality
〈β(cost)〉 true with various values of cost, using di-
chotomic search to reduce the number of invocations
of EVALUATOR. Then, the probability of the peak
cost sequence is obtained by checking the formula
{β(peak)}≥?0.
– If the paths of interest are infinite, the analysis can
be done by checking the formula {β(cost)}≥?0 for
various values of cost and observing the variation of
the probability.
These analyses can be easily automated in CADP using
SVL scripts.
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6.2 Bounded Retransmission Protocol
We consider here an action-based specification of Philips’
Bounded Retransmission Protocol (BRP) developed ini-
tially in LOTOS and analyzed by model checking using a
data-handling version of ACTL [42]. The BRP protocol
is designed to transmit large data packets over an unre-
liable medium by splitting them in small chunks, which
are sent sequentially. After each chunk transmission, the
sender waits for an acknowledgment from the receiver
before sending the next chunk. If the acknowledgment
does not arrive because of a communication failure, the
sender times out and retransmits the chunk. In case of
repeated failures, only a bounded number of retransmis-
sions are allowed, after which the protocol aborts the
transmission of the packet. The protocol informs the
sender and the receiver about the outcome of each packet
transmission by sending OK, NOK, or DK indications,
denoting success, failure, or uncertainty (loss of the last
acknowledgment) of the transmission, respectively.
To carry out a probabilistic analysis of the BRP pro-
tocol, we resorted to a state-based probabilistic modeling
initially proposed in [18] and also available as a PRISM
benchmark2. Starting from an LNT description of the
BRP protocol (strongly bisimilar to the initial LOTOS
description in [42]) available as a CADP demo exam-
ple3, we converted it on the fly into a PTS by setting
a 2% probability for chunk losses and a 1% probabil-
ity for acknowledgment losses, keeping all the other ac-
tions equiprobable, and considering the transmission of
a single data packet as in [18]. We specified in MCL the
action-based counterparts of the six PCTL properties
given in [18], of which we illustrate below only the prop-
erties Pa and P3, the other ones having similar shapes.
Pa evaluates the probability that the sender reports an
unsuccessful transmission after the complete packet
was received (this should never occur!):
{ (¬{OUTPUT !OK})∗.{OUTPUT !OK}.
(¬{INPUT !NOK})∗.{INPUT !NOK}
}=0
This MCL formula requires a zero probability
measure for the sequences containing a success-
ful indication delivered to the receiver (action
“OUTPUT !OK”) followed by an unsuccessful indi-
cation to the sender (action “INPUT !NOK”).
P3 evaluates the probability that the sender reports
an unsuccessful transmission after more than eight
chunks of the packet have been transmitted:
{ ((¬REC L)∗.REC L) {8 ...}.
(¬(REC L ∨ {INPUT !NOK}))∗.{INPUT !NOK}
}≥?0
2 http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies/brp.php
3 http://cadp.inria.fr/demos.html, demo 16
This MCL formula asks for the probability measure
of a sequence containing eight chunk acknowledg-
ments received by the sender (action “REC L”) fol-
lowed by an unsuccessful indication to the sender (ac-
tion “INPUT !NOK”).
We checked the six properties using explicit-state
PRISM and EVALUATOR on the corresponding BRP
models for five retransmissions and packet lengths be-
tween 16 and 256 chunks. The probability values for
all six properties obtained using CADP and PRISM are
identical to the ones reported in [18], which suggests that
the action-based model in [42] and the state-based model
in [18] are consistent, even if they are quite different
in structure. The performance measures of CADP and
PRISM are shown in Figure 10. We observe that CADP
consumes up to one order of magnitude less memory
than PRISM, which is in turn faster on small configu-
rations but becomes slower for properties P1, P2, and
P3 on larger configurations (packets with more than 150
chunks). For all six MCL formulas, the LESs produced
by EVALUATOR have acyclic SFGs.
Probability of successful packet transmission. In addi-
tion to the six probabilistic properties of the BRP an-
alyzed in [18], we also studied how the total number
of retries during a packet transmission influences the
probability of the packet being successfully received.
The MCL formula below computes the probability of
a successful packet transmission (initiated by an action
“INPUT PACKET” and concluded by an action “INPUT
!OK”) when the total number of retries occurring when
sending the chunks is equal to retries.
{ INPUT PACKET.
loop (r:nat:=0) in
if (r = retries) then
exit
else
(¬{SEND K ...})∗.{SEND K ... ?c:nat}.
loop (nc:nat:=0) : (rc:nat) in
exit (nc)
|
(
(¬({OUTPUT !c ?any} ∨ {SEND K ... !c}))∗.
{SEND K ... !c}.continue (nc+ 1)
)
end loop.
(¬({OUTPUT !c ?any} ∨ {SEND K ... !c}))∗.
{OUTPUT !c ?any}.continue (r + rc)
end if
end loop.
(¬{INPUT !OK})∗.{INPUT !OK}
}≥?0
The outer “loop” subformula counts the total number
of retries in the iteration variable r by summing up the
retries that occur for every chunk c, i.e., the number of
retransmissions (actions “SEND K ... !c”) occurring after
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Fig. 10: Execution time and memory consumption of CADP and PRISM for checking the six probabilistic properties
in [18] on the BRP model for five retries and a packet size k between 16 and 256 data chunks.
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Fig. 11: Probability of successful packet transmission for
the BRP model with two retries and packet size k = 32,
depending on the total number of retries
the chunk was sent for the first time and before it was
received (action “OUTPUT !c ?any”). These retries are
counted by the inner “loop” in the iteration variable nc
and provided as result in the return variable rc.
Figure 11 shows the variation of the probability of
successfully transmitting a packet of length k = 32 with
maximum two retries per chunk, when the total num-
ber of retries varies between 0 and 64. This probability
is high (99, 9%) when no retries occur, and decreases
very fast with the total number of retries (0, 05% for
five retries). This indicates that with a 2% chunk loss
probability and a 1% acknowledgment loss probability,
the BRP protocol is already quasi-reliable, the proba-
bility of a successful packet transmission such that the
retransmission bound was reached for each chunk being
negligible (10−110 for 64 retries).
Of course, this analysis can be carried out with
PRISM as well, by introducing an additional variable
in the PRISM model of the BRP for counting the total
number of retries; on the other hand, the action-based
analysis using the MCL formula above (which is inde-
pendent of the packet length and retransmission bound
parameters of the BRP) does not require to change the
PTS model.
6.3 Randomized Protocols
We consider here two randomized protocols taken from
the PRISM benchmarks suite. The first one is the Israeli-
Jalfon (IJ) self-stabilizing protocol [32], which operates
on a set of k concurrent processes P0, ..., Pk−1 connected
on a ring topology and brings them after a finite number
of steps to a stable configuration, where only one process
is privileged (i.e., has a token). The IJ protocol is asyn-
chronous and communication on the ring is bidirectional.
When a process has a token, it can be scheduled for exe-
cution and it must pass the token with equal probability
to its left or right neighbor process on the ring. If two
tokens reach the same process, they are merged into a
single one.
The fundamental property of self-stabilisation pro-
tocols is that starting from any configuration, a stable
configuration is reached with probability one. This can
be expressed in MCL as follows:
{ (¬ϕstable? . true)∗. ϕstable? }=1
where
ϕstable = exists i:nat among {0 ... n− 1} .
(〈{EXE !i}〉 true ∧ [{EXE ?j:Nat where j 6= i}] false)
The state formula ϕstable expresses that a single process
Pi can execute an action in the current state (action
“{EXE !i}”).
Figure 12 shows the time and memory consumed
by EVALUATOR and explicit-state PRISM for check-
ing the self-stabilisation property on the corresponding
LNT and DTMC descriptions of the IJ protocol. Both
tools exhibit similar performance on medium-sized con-
figurations (k ≤ 15 processes), PRISM becoming more
efficient for larger configurations. The SFGs of the LESs
produced by EVALUATOR contain several SCCs, e.g.,
for k = 10 the SFG contains 8 SCCs, of which the largest
one has 756 variables and was solved in 22 iterations.
The second example considered is a version of the
randomized Lehmann-Rabin (LR) dining philosophers
protocol without fairness assumptions [21]. Each of the
k philosophers picks his forks in a random order if they
are both available, and releases them in any order af-
ter eating and before returning to thinking. We modeled
the system in LNT and checked the basic property stat-
ing that a hungry philosopher will be able to eat with
probability one:
[true∗.{THINK ?p:nat}]
{ (¬{EAT !p})∗.{EAT !p} }=1
This MCL formula combines a regular box modality
searching all states in which a philosopher p becomes
hungry (i.e., immediately after performing an action
“{THINK !p}”), and a regular probabilistic operator
checking the reachability of an action “{EAT !p}” with
probability one. The value extraction mechanism, which
captures the value of p present on a transition label in
the box modality and reuses it in the probabilistic oper-
ator, enables to check configurations of the system with
different values of k without changing the formula.
Figure 13 shows the performance of CADP and
explicit-state PRISM for checking the above property
on their respective models of the LR protocol. On this
example, PRISM is increasingly faster but also increas-
ingly demanding in memory (one order of magnitude
difference with CADP for six philosophers). Also on this
example, the SFGs of the LESs produced by EVALU-
ATOR contain several SCCs, e.g., for k = 4 the SFG
contains 180 SCCs, of which the largest one has 3016
variables and was solved in 25 iterations.
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Fig. 12: Execution time and memory consumption of CADP and PRISM for computing the probability of reaching
a stable state on the self-stabilising protocol with 3 ≤ k ≤ 20 concurrent processes.
Fig. 13: Execution time and memory consumption of CADP and PRISM for computing the probability that a hungry
philosopher eats on the LR dining philosophers protocol with 3 ≤ k ≤ 6 philosophers.
7 Conclusion and future work
We proposed a regular probabilistic operator for comput-
ing the probability measure of complex paths in a PTS
whose actions contain data values. Paths are specified us-
ing the action-based, data handling regular formulas of
MCL [48] that we extended with a general iteration oper-
ator “loop” enabling the specification of complex (Tur-
ing computable) paths. These new operators subsume
those of P(A)CTL, and make possible the study of paths
whose associated cost, calculated from the data values
present on their actions, has a given value. We defined
an on-the-fly model checking method based on reformu-
lating the problem as the resolution of a linear equation
system (LES) and a Boolean equation system (BES),
and implemented it in the EVALUATOR model checker
of the CADP toolbox. Several experiments showed that
this on-the-fly verification procedure exhibits a perfor-
mance comparable to the explicit-state algorithms of the
PRISM model checker.
Since the PTS is explored on the fly by annotating
the transitions of the original LTS with probabilities,
the high-level description of the concurrent system un-
der analysis (written, in our case, in the LNT language)
remains unchanged, and can serve therefore as unique
model for both functional and quantitative analysis, the
details of which can be encapsulated in SVL scripts.
The on-the-fly analysis back-end (which is currently
sequential) can be enhanced with distributed capabil-
ities by connecting it with the MUMPS distributed
solver [2] for sparse LESs. We also plan to investi-
gate the adequacy of MCL fragments w.r.t. proba-
bilistic branching bisimulation, which would enable the
(property-preserving) compositional construction and
minimization of PTSs described as Interactive Proba-
bilistic Chains [17]. Finally, we will seek to extend our
approach (which deals only with finite paths described
using data handling regular formulas) to handle infi-
nite paths satisfying ω-regular properties, along the lines
of [7, Chap. 10].
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